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Do Legal Origins Predict Legal Substance?
Anu Bradford    Columbia University
Yun-chien Chang    Academia Sinica
Adam Chilton    University of Chicago
Nuno Garoupa    George Mason University
Abstract
There is a large body of research in economics and law suggesting that the legal
origin of a country—that is, whether its legal regime is based on English common law or French, German, or Nordic civil law—profoundly impacts a range
of outcomes. However, the exact relationship between legal origin and legal substance has been disputed in the literature and not fully explored with nuanced
legal coding. We revisit this debate while leveraging novel cross-country data
sets that provide detailed coding of two areas of laws: property and antitrust. We
find that having shared legal origins strongly predicts whether countries have
similar property regimes but does little to predict whether countries have similar antitrust regimes. Our results suggest that legal origin may be an important
predictor of legal substance in well-established legal regimes but does little to
explain substantive variation in more recent areas of law.

1. Introduction
Most countries’ legal systems can be traced to a handful of models, such as English common law or French civil law. An extensive body of research in economics and law suggests that the legal model a country follows—known as its legal
origin—has profound long-run effects on a number of economic, political, and
social outcomes. These outcomes range from growth in gross domestic product
(GDP) per capita (Mahoney 2001), to the use of military conscription (Mulligan
We thank the referees, Adam Badawi, Dennis Carlton, Albert Chen, Chun-Fang Chiang, Xin Dai,
Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Christoph Engel, Hanjo Hamann, Haibo He, Han-wei Ho, Tai-kuang Ho,
Chia-shin Hsu, Weiqiang Hu, William Hubbard, Dan Klerman, Hui-Wen Koo, Monika Leszczyńska,
Ming-Jen Lin, Shitong Qiao, Qiming Ren, Kyle Rozema, Benqian Sang, Bing Shui, Holger Spamann,
Haochen Sun, Dennis Tang, Stefan Tontrup, Emanuel Towfigh, Yue Wang, Tao Xi, Guangdong Xu,
Wenming Xu, Jun Xue, Ran You, Angela Zhang, Lei Zhao, and Wei Zhong and participants at the
2019 Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, the 2019 Fifth International Conference on Empirical Legal Studies of Judicial Systems, the 2019 Economic History Workshop (National Taiwan University), the Law and Economics Workshop (Hong Kong University), the faculty workshop at the
[  Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 64 (May 2021)]
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and Shleifer 2005a, 2005b), to transmission rates of HIV (Anderson 2018), to climate change policies (Fredriksson and Wollscheid 2015), to criminal incarceration (D’Amico and Williamson 2015), and to judicial decisions (Zhang, Liu, and
Garoupa 2018).
The start of the so-called legal origins literature is widely credited to four
scholars—Rafael La Porta, Florencio López-de-Silanes, Andre Shleifer, and
Robert Vishny—jointly known as LLSV (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998). They study
cross-country differences in financial development and document significant
variance in the legal protections that different countries afford to investors. According to LLSV, much of this variance can be traced to countries’ legal origins,
with common-law countries providing more extensive investor protections than
civil-law countries. This relationship led La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer
(2008, p. 326) to conclude that “legal rules and regulations differ systematically
across countries, and . . . these differences in legal rules and regulations are accounted for to a significant extent by legal origins.”
The research by LLSV launched an influential literature examining the significance of legal origins (Mahoney 2001; Dam 2006; Roe 2006; La Porta, López-deSilanes, and Shleifer 2008; Oto-Peralías and Romero-Ávila 2017). This research
shows that legal origins are correlated with aspects of countries’ legal systems like
property rights and judicial independence and that those differences are in turn
correlated with greater economic growth (Anderson 2018, p. 1411). But this literature has also been highly contested in academic debates. For instance, it has
been criticized for ignoring systematic differences between countries that predate
their legal origins (Klerman et al. 2011) and for failing to document the mechanisms through which legal origins impact contemporary outcomes (Bazzi and
Clemens 2013).1
This literature has also been critiqued for possibly overstating the extent to
which countries that share legal origins have similar substantive laws. Most notably, in their prominent initial study, LLSV’s data suggest that legal origins predict
the legal protections provided to investors (La Porta et al. 1998), which implies
School of Law and Economics (China University of Political Science), the 2019 Cross-Straight Conference (Peking University), the Empirical Legal Studies Workshop (EBS Law School, W
 iesbaden),
and the faculty workshop at the School of Law (Ocean University of China) for comments on earlier
drafts. We are also grateful to Patrick Huang, Ming-yen Tai, Bartosz Woda, and Patrick Wu, who
helped compile the data, and to the over 100 research assistants at Columbia Law School who helped
us gather and code the antitrust data. Chang thanks his 23 research assistants for coding assistance
and Academia Sinica for funding this project (Career Development Award 106-H02). Bradford acknowledges the support of the National Science Foundation (National Science Foundation law and
social sciences grants 1228453 and 1228483), a Columbia Global Policy Grant, and additional financial support from Columbia Law School, including the Millstein Center for Global Markets and
Corporate Ownership.
1
There are, of course, examples of research that takes steps to avoid these concerns. For instance,
Oto-Peralías and Romero-Ávila (2014) trace the link between endowments and current legal outcomes within the English common-law legal family through the colonial legal administrative apparatus. The measure of the extent of indirect rule in each colony is constructed as the ratio of colonially recognized customary court cases to the total number of court cases in 1955, with the latter
comprising both customary court cases heard by native chiefs and magistrate court cases handled by
British officials.
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that countries with similar legal origins are likely to offer similar legal protections. However, subsequent research demonstrates that the link between countries’ legal origins and their investor protections can be attributed to errors in
LLSV’s coding of countries’ laws (Spamann 2010a). Once these errors are corrected, the correlation between countries’ legal origins and their investor protections disappear. This finding calls into question the link between legal origins
and legal substance and undermines a key contribution of the legal origins literature. And because detailed cross-country coding of most areas of law does not
exist,2 the relationship between legal origins and legal substance has not been adequately explored to date.
Moreover, even if legal origins once predicted the substantive legal rules that
countries adopted, it is not obvious that this influence persists today. For example,
early in their history, common-law countries may have primarily looked to other
common-law countries when drafting their laws. But today those same countries
may instead look to a country that is a leading regulator in a given area of law as
their model, regardless of whether that country had the same legal origins. In addition, countries may now model their legal rules on the ones adopted or recommended by international or regional organizations, such as the European Union
(EU), instead of emulating countries with shared legal origins or histories. If this
is correct, legal origins may not explain the variation in laws that countries have
adopted more recently.
This article provides a more comprehensive assessment of the relationship between legal origins and legal substance than what exists to date. We are able to
do this because of two new comparative data sets that provide detailed coding of
substantive legal regimes around the world: one data set documents countries’
property laws, and the other documents countries’ antitrust laws. To the best of
our knowledge, with the exception of data sets that code national constitutions,
these data sets represent the largest cross-country efforts to code entire bodies
of law. These data sets thus allow us to assess the relationship between legal origins and legal substance with more nuance than prior research. Moreover, they
offer the practical advantage of covering one older area of regulation (property)
and one newer area of regulation (antitrust). Unlike LLSV’s work and related research, both data sets were also coded for projects unrelated to the study of legal
origins, which makes it less likely that any errors in their coding correlate with
countries’ legal origins.
We also use a method that we believe is novel to studying the relationship between legal origins and legal substance. Prior research projects aggregated relevant variables to create indexes of aspects of countries’ legal systems3 and then
assessed whether legal origins are correlated with higher or lower scores on them.
2
Corporate law is an exception. See the extensive literature in the field, for example, Armour et al.
(2009a, 2009b), Jackson and Roe (2009), Roe (2006), La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2013),
La Porta et al. (1998), and Spamann (2010a).
3
For example, La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) create an index of countries’ legal protections provided to
investors, and Botero et al. (2004) create an index of countries’ legal protections afforded to workers.
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The shortcoming with this aggregated-variable approach, however, is that countries may have similar index scores despite having dissimilar underlying laws. In
contrast, we borrow a method previously used to study legal diffusion (Elkins,
Ginsburg, and Melton 2008; Law and Versteeg 2012; Bradford et al. 2019a) and
use country pairs as our unit of observation. We calculate the correlation between
each pair of countries’ property regimes and the correlation between the same
pair of countries’ antitrust regimes. We then regress the correlations of property
law and antitrust law against a dummy variable for whether a country pair has
the same legal origin.
Across a range of regression specifications, our empirical analysis shows that
having the same legal origin is strongly associated with having more similar property laws, but it has no clear association with countries’ antitrust laws. This finding suggests that legal origin may have been a powerful determinant of a country’s substantive laws in some areas, but the influence of legal origin may have
waned in other areas. We offer suggestive evidence that this result is explained,
at least in part, by alternative influences that have shaped a country’s antitrust
laws more than its shared legal origin or colonial history—a trend that is absent
in property law.
2. Background
2.1. The Legal Origins Literature
Scholars have long documented how countries’ legal systems are largely based
on common-law or civil-law models initially developed in Europe (David and
Brierley 1985; Glendon, Gordon, and Osakwe 1994; Zweigert and Kötz 1998; Garoupa and Pargendler 2014). These legal models were then transmitted around
the world through mechanisms like conquest, colonization, and commerce. As a
result of this diffusion, although countries’ laws are heterogenous in a myriad of
ways, their legal systems can be grouped into a handful of categories according
to their original models.4 These groups have alternatively been described as legal
origins, legal traditions, and legal families.5
In the 1990s, an influential line of research began to examine the link between
countries’ legal origins and their contemporary economic outcomes. This research began with two seminal articles from LLSV: La Porta et al. (1997) and
(1998). These articles document a link between countries’ legal origins and the
substantive legal protections they provide to investors and then further argue
that stronger investor protections are associated with greater financial development. The finding that legal origins explain much of the variation in countries’
economic performance led to an explosion of research. This research generally
4
The way to divide these groups is contested. For example, La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and
Shleifer (2008) divide countries into four groups; Klerman et al. (2011) divide countries into six
groups; and Chang, Garoupa, and Wells (2021) argue that countries can be divided into any number
of groups.
5
On the controversies concerning legal families’ taxonomy, see Pargendler (2012).
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followed LLSV, demonstrating the link between legal origins and cross-country
legal differences and then showing how those legal differences are associated with
important outcomes.
In a review of this literature, La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008)
argue that the research on legal origins can be broken into three categories.6 The
first category of research directly follows LLSV’s work by examining the relationship between legal origins and some aspect of investor protection, corporate
law, or contract enforcement (for example, La Porta et al. 1999, 2000, 2002; Dyck
and Zingales 2004; Djankov, McLiesh, and Ramalho 2006; La Porta, López-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer 2006; Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer 2007; Djankov et al.
2008a, 2008b; Spamann 2010b). The second category of research documents the
link between legal origins and government regulation of economic activity and
markets (Djankov et al. 2002, 2003b; Botero et al. 2004; Mulligan and Shleifer
2005a, 2005b). The third category investigates the relationship between legal origins and features of the judiciary (for example, Djankov et al. 2003a, 2008a; La
Porta et al. 2004). Although there are differences in the methods and data used in
these categories of research, they all largely find that common-law legal systems
are associated with more secure property rights, greater levels of judicial independence, and superior financial development.
2.2. The Link between Legal Origins and Legal Substance
In addition to being widely influential, this literature has also been widely criticized (Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard 2003a, 2003b; Rajan and Zingales 2003;
Licht, Goldschmidt, and Schwartz 2005; Roe 2006; Klerman and Mahoney 2007;
Roe and Siegel 2009; Spamann 2010a, 2010b; Bazzi and Clemens 2013). One line
of criticism argues that cross-country differences in economic outcomes are better explained by factors other than legal origins. For example, former British colonies were wealthier than former French colonies at the time of colonization, and
thus it is unsurprising that they are wealthier today (Klerman et al. 2011). Another line of criticism notes that countries with the same colonial or legal histories are likely to be similar along a range of social, political, and legal dimensions,
which makes it nearly impossible to reliably trace the relationship between legal
origins and contemporary outcomes through a specific mechanism (Bazzi and
Clemens 2013).
The line of criticism that is relevant to our project questions the link between
legal origins and legal substance. Most notably, Spamann (2010a) corrects inaccuracies in the data used by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) to measure investor protection. When using the corrected data, Spamann (2010a) no longer finds that
countries with common-law legal origins have stronger legal protections. Relatedly, Licht, Goldschmidt, and Schwartz (2005) reexamine the link between le6
This literature has continued to develop since La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer reviewed it in 2008, yet these broad categories of research lines remain largely consistent. For more
recent surveys of the legal origins literature, see Spamann (2015, pp. 135–37) and Oto-Peralías and
Romero-Ávila (2017).
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gal origins and legal substance while accounting for cross-country cultural differences and conclude that the variation in legal regimes between countries with
different legal origins may be overstated.
Moreover, the existing literature has done little to explore whether the link between legal origins and legal substance has continued even while new patterns of
legal diffusion have emerged.7 Although colonization may have previously been
a primary method of legal diffusion, other forms subsequently developed (Linos
2011, 2013; Gadinis 2015). For instance, institutions like the EU, Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and World Bank have
urged countries, regardless of their legal origins, to adopt certain legal regimes on
the basis of best practices in a wide range of policy areas (Bradford et al. 2019).
In fact, in the 1990s, La Porta et al. (1998, p. 1119) recognized that these alternative patterns of diffusion may have greater influence over corporate law going
forward. The current link between legal origins and legal substance may thus be
more tenuous than earlier research suggests.
2.3. Our Approach
Our goal is to conduct a more nuanced study of the relationship between legal
origins and legal substance than has previously been done. To do so, we examine
the correlations between legal origins and the substance of countries’ property
laws and antitrust laws. We focus on these two areas because a detailed coding
of countries’ laws in these domains has recently been completed. To our knowledge, along with projects that code national constitutions (Elkins, Ginsburg, and
Melton 2009; Law and Versteeg 2012, 2013; Ginsburg and Versteeg 2014; Gutmann, Hayo, and Voigt 2014), these are the most detailed data sets available in
comparative law.8
Focusing on these areas of law provides two practical advantages. First, property is one of the first areas of law that countries adopt, often shortly after their
modern legal systems are established. In contrast, although a handful of countries
adopted antitrust regimes prior to World War II, most antitrust laws were adopted after 1990 (Bradford et al. 2019b). This variance allows us to test one area of
law with old roots and another area of law with new roots. Second, these data sets
were coded for projects unrelated to the study of legal origins. Thus, any coding
errors are unlikely to be correlated with countries’ legal origins because of subjective bias, conscious or not, of the researchers.
In addition to using new data, our research design is also different than prior
efforts to explore the link between legal origins and legal substance. Prior research uses the country as the unit of analysis and creates indexes to represent
countries’ legal substance (for example, Oto-Peralías and Romero-Ávila 2014).
Although creating an index is a reasonable and standard way to measure legal
7
But see Spamann (2009a), who observes that, at least in some fields, legal diffusion has tracked
legal origins.
8
As Spamann (2009b, p. 798) points out, large-sample, quantitative comparative law research
projects often rely on a narrow set of information for each country. Our study is an exception.
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systems, there are several drawbacks to using one to measure the similarity of legal regimes across countries. For one, it is possible that countries have the same
scores on an index while having dissimilar legal regimes.9 For another, indexes
are often created using just a handful of variables, and those variables may not
capture the intricacies of a country’s legal regime.
Instead of looking at individual countries while using a single index of countries’ property laws or antitrust laws, we use pairs of countries as our unit of observation. By looking at pairs of countries, we can examine the correlation in
their laws across a large number of distinct variables. This approach has the advantage of directly assessing how similar legal provisions are across countries that
have shared legal origins. In other words, our research design measures whether
countries with shared legal origins are more likely to have highly correlated property or antitrust regimes.
3. Data
3.1. Legal Substance Data
Our property law data are introduced in Chang, Garoupa, and Wells (2021).
The data set contains more than 250 variables on the contents of property law
in 156 jurisdictions based on laws in 2015. Most of the jurisdictions in the data
set are countries, but some of them are subnational jurisdictions that have their
own property laws, such as Hong Kong, Macau, and Scotland. As property laws
are not always enacted at the national level, in some cases the data use certain
subnational jurisdictions as proxies for the whole nation.10 Of the variables in the
data, 108 key variables were selected and transformed into 170 dummy variables
to construe property legal families. The dummy variables include, for instance,
whether a country allows adverse possession of landownership and whether a
country explicitly stipulates the numerus clausus principle. For our analysis, we
use the same 170 variables.
Our antitrust law data are from the Comparative Competition Law Dataset introduced in Bradford et al. (2019b). This data set consists of detailed coding of
antitrust law provisions from 131 jurisdictions—126 countries and five regional
organizations—from the beginning of modern antitrust law until 2010. Because
many jurisdictions have multiple relevant laws, the data set contains the coding
of 700 individual laws. For each law, it includes a number of substantive variables
regarding merger review, the regulation of anticompetitive agreements, and the
9
To illustrate this point, imagine an index composed of four binary variables (A, B, C, and D) that
are added together to create an index. If country X has provisions A and B coded 1, it may receive a
score of 2 of 4 on the index. But if country Y has provisions C and D coded 1, it may also receive a
score of 2 of 4 on the index despite having made entirely different substantive legal choices.
10
For instance, New York property law is used as a proxy for US property law (which is a reasonable choice, given that Chang, Garoupa, and Wells [2021] find that it strongly correlates with
California property law). In addition, property law in England and Wales is used as a proxy for UK
property law; Ontario property law is used as a proxy for Canadian property law; and China’s 2018
draft civil code, which is almost the same as the civil code eventually passed in May 2020, is used as
a proxy for Chinese property law, disregarding Hong Kong’s and Macau’s different property laws.
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abuse of dominance. It also includes variables that capture the institutional design of the antitrust regime, including whether the law recognizes a private right
of action, the possibility of fines, or imprisonment as a remedy. Importantly, the
data set contains the coding of the antitrust law regime in force in any given year,
which means that it layers all the old and new laws in force in any given year to
capture the entire set of antitrust laws in force each year. For our analysis, we use
the 91 dummy variables in the data set that measure the substance of countries’
antitrust regimes.
Figure 1 maps the coverage of our property and antitrust data. We have both
property and antitrust data for 91 countries. As Figure 1 shows, the data sets include observations from all regions of the world, and the countries for which
both data sets are available include the world’s leading economies. Following the
LLSV tradition, our analysis weights all countries equally, regardless of their relative wealth, population, or political importance.
3.2. Legal Origins Data
Our primary coding of countries’ legal origins is based on data from LLSV (we
also use three alternative measures of legal origins in Section 4.4).11 The LLSV
data set breaks countries into four categories. It first codes countries as either
having common-law or civil-law legal traditions. Countries with civil-law traditions are further broken into one of three traditions: French, German, or Nordic.
Even if countries incorporate influences from other legal traditions over time, the
LLSV data still code countries on the basis of the initial legal origin.
Figure 2 presents countries’ legal origins using the LLSV coding. As Figure 2
shows, many countries are of French legal origin, countries with German legal
origin cluster in central Europe and East Asia, and Africa is divided among these
two legal origins and English common law. Of the 91 countries in our sample,
there are 13 countries with common-law legal origins, 57 countries with French
civil-law legal origins, 17 with German civil-law legal origins, and four with Nordic civil-law legal origins.
3.3. Data Set Construction
Because our goal is to test whether countries with shared legal origins have
similar substantive legal regimes, our unit of analysis is pairs of countries or, as
they are referred to in the international relations literature, country dyads. To
ensure that differences in data availability do not drive our results, we restrict our
sample to dyads for which we have data on countries’ property laws, antitrust
laws, and legal origins. This results in a sample of 4,095 dyads composed of 91
11
For the data, see Andrei Shleifer, data file (https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/shleifer/files/data
_2.zip). The zipped file contains two spreadsheets. We use the legor07 variable in Legal_origins
_JEL2008.dta; English common law is 1, French civil law is 2, German civil law is 4, and Nordic law
is 5.

Figure 1. Availability of property and antitrust law data by country

Figure 2. Legal origins by country using coding from La Porta et al. (1997, 1998)
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countries (91 × 90/2 = 4,095). Table OA1 in the Online Appendix lists the countries in our data set.
For each dyad, we create a measure of the similarity of their property laws and
antitrust laws by calculating the correlation coefficient for all of the variables in
each data set. We use this measure of similarity because its scale from −1 (indicating perfectly opposite coding) to 1 (indicating perfectly identical coding) provides an intuitive interpretation and because it is a method that has been previously used to study the similarity of legal regimes (Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton
2008; Law and Versteeg 2012; Bradford et al. 2019a).12 For instance, for the Albania-Vietnam dyad, we calculate the correlation between Albania’s and Vietnam’s
coding for the 170 property variables. They have the same coding for 121 of 170
variables, which results in a correlation of .45. We similarly calculate the correlation of each dyad’s antitrust laws on the basis of 91 variables in our data set. Albania and Vietnam have the same coding for 71 of 91 variables, which results in
a correlation of .57.
For each dyad, we also create a variable to indicate whether the two countries
have a shared legal origin. To do so, we code countries as having a shared legal
origin if both countries in the dyad are coded as belonging to the same legal origin as categorized by LLSV. For instance, we code Australia-Canada as having a
shared legal origin because LLSV categorizes both as having English common-
law origin, and we code Algeria–Ivory Coast as having a shared legal origin because LLSV categorizes both as having French civil-law origin. In total, 44.3 percent of the dyads (1,816 of 4,095) have a shared legal origin.
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for our dyad-level data set. In addition
to the variables mentioned above, Table 1 also reports summary statistics for six
control variables we use in some regression specifications. Four of these control
variables are measured at the dyad level: Distance, Contiguity, Common National
Language, and Common Ethnic Language.13 The other two are measured at the
country level: Population and Nominal GDP (we use the natural logs because
they are both right skewed, and it is likely that their ratios are relevant to the relationships we are testing).14

12
Section 4.5 uses an alternative measure of similarity based on the percentage of variables for
which the countries in a dyad have the same coding.
13
These variables are from the dist_cepii.dta data set; see Center for Prospective Studies and Inter
national Information, GeoDist (http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/download.asp?id=6).
Distance codes the population-weighted distance (in kilometers) between the two countries, Contiguity codes if the two countries have contiguous borders, Common National Language codes if the
countries have the same official primary language, and Common Ethnic Language codes if the same
language is spoken by at least 9 percent of the population in the countries.
14
These variables are from the gravdata.dta data set; see Center for Prospective Studies and International Information, Gravity (http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/download.asp?id=8).
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Table 1
Summary Statistics

Property law correlation
Antitrust law correlation
Shared legal origin (LLSV)
Shared legal origin (Klerman et al. 2011)
Shared colonial origin (Klerman et al. 2011)
Shared legal order
Distance
Contiguous
Common national language
Common ethnic language
Population of country 1
Population of country 2
Nominal gross domestic product of country 1
Nominal gross domestic product of country 2

Mean

SD

Min

Max

.30
.43
.44
.37
.27
.11
8.56
.03
.08
.09
2.72
2.71
11.73
11.82

.14
.13
.50
.48
.44
.31
.92
.17
.27
.29
1.52
1.55
1.90
1.90

−.07
−.04
.00
.00
.00
.00
4.74
.00
.00
.00
−.89
−.89
7.62
7.62

.99
.85
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
9.88
1.00
1.00
1.00
7.20
7.20
16.52
16.52

Note. Distance is the natural log (in kilometers) weighted by population. Population is the natural
log of populations in millions. LLSV = Rafael La Porta, Florencio López-de-Silanes, Andre Shleifer,
and Robert Vishny. N = 4,095 dyads.

4. Results
4.1. Graphical Evidence
Figure 3 graphs the correlations of dyads’ substantive laws by whether they
share legal origins. The X-axis is the correlation coefficient between two dyads’
substantive law variables, and the Y-axis is the percentage of dyads that have a
given correlation.
Three results from Figure 3 are worth highlighting. First, almost all dyads have
positive correlations for both areas of law. Just .8 percent of dyads (31 of 4,095)
have property laws that are negatively correlated. These include several dyads
with no obvious connections, like Pakistan-Portugal and Madagascar-Taiwan.
Moreover, just .07 percent of dyads (3 of 4,095) have antitrust laws that are negatively correlated: Qatar-Tajikistan, Bolivia–South Africa, and Tajikistan-Kuwait.
Second, the correlations are lower on average for property law than for antitrust law. For property law, dyads have a mean correlation of .30 and a median
correlation of .29. For antitrust law, dyads have a mean correlation of .43 and a
median correlation of .43. This difference is notable given the distribution of correlations for both types of law. To illustrate, only 18 percent of dyads have a correlation above .43 for property law (which is the median for antitrust law). The
higher correlations for antitrust are likely because most countries with antitrust
laws adopted them only in the last few decades, and when they did adopt them,
they followed models from the EU and the United States (Bradford et al. 2019a).
Third, having a shared legal origin is associated with higher correlations for
property law, but it is not associated with higher correlations for antitrust law.
For property law, dyads without a shared legal origin have a mean correlation of
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Figure 3. Correlations of legal substance by shared legal origin. A, Property laws; B, antitrust laws.

.27, and dyads with a shared legal origin have a mean correlation of .34. For antitrust law, however, dyads without a shared legal origin have a mean correlation
of .43, and dyads with a shared legal origin also have a mean correlation of .43.
4.2. Empirical Specification
To more formally test the relationship between shared legal origins and similar
substance of laws, we estimate equation (1) for Dyadjt:
(1) a jt = α + SLO jt β0 + ζ jt′ β1 + χ ′j β2 + χt′β3 + ϕ j + ηt + ε jt .

(1)

The dependent variable ajt is one of two measures of the similarity between legal
regimes: the correlation coefficient between a dyad’s property laws or the cor-
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relation coefficient between a dyad’s antitrust laws. The key independent variable
SLOjt codes whether the countries in a given dyad have a shared legal origin. For
example, SLOjt equals one if both countries in a dyad have English common-law
legal origins but equals zero if one country’s legal origin is English common law
while the legal origin of the other country in the dyad is French civil law. In addition, ζ¢ represents control variables measured for Dyadjt , χ¢ represents control
variables that are measured separately for country j and for country t in Dyadjt ,
φj represents fixed effects for country j, ηt represents fixed effects for country t,15
and εjt is the error term. Because the errors for a given country are likely to be
correlated for all the dyads that include it, we use multiway clustering to cluster
our standard errors for both country j and country t.
It is important to note that it would be inappropriate to control for most variables that may influence the correlations between dyads’ property or antitrust
laws. This is because legal origins have been linked to a range of outcomes that
occur after countries acquire a given legal origin (Bazzi and Clemens 2013), and
many natural control variables are thus likely to have been influenced by legal origin. Therefore, controlling for factors like economic growth, political regimes, or
membership in international institutions would be, in the words of Angrist and
Pischke (2009), “bad controls”—or, in the language of political science, would
introduce posttreatment bias. We thus use only a minimal set of control variables
in our regressions.
4.3. Primary Results
Tables 2 and 3 report the results estimating equation (1) for property law and
antitrust law, respectively. Column 1 simply includes the shared legal origin variable, column 2 adds fixed effects for country j and country t in each dyad,16 and
column 3 adds controls for the distance and contiguous borders between countries. Column 3 is our preferred specification because it does not include any variables likely to have been influenced by countries’ shared legal origins (that is, it
does not include any bad controls). For illustrative purposes, although these additional variables may be influenced by having a shared legal origin, in column 4
we add controls for whether dyads have common national and ethnic languages,
and in column 5 we add controls for each country in a given dyad’s population
and nominal GDP.
15
Because we have only one observation per dyad, we are unable to include fixed effects for combinations of states. Instead, the country fixed effects we include pick up any unobserved heterogeneity for all the dyads of which a given country is a member. That said, one concern with this approach
is that a country can be country j in some dyads and country t in some dyads. The result is that the
fixed effect for a country may be different for dyads in which the country is indexed as country j than
for dyads in which the country is indexed as country t. In Section OA2 of the Online Appendix, we
address this concern by developing a leave-out measure of all of a countries’ other correlations (regardless of whether the country is indexed as country j or country t in a dyad) for which we control
as an alternative to fixed effects.
16
The F-test of the joint significance of the fixed effects allows us to reject the null hypothesis that
the coefficients for the fixed effects are 0 (in other words, including the fixed effects increases the explanatory power of our regressions).
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Table 2
Primary Results: Property Law Correlations
Shared legal origin
Distance

(1)

(2)

.070**
(.012)

.103**
(.016)

No
.058

Yes
.318

Contiguous
Common national language
Common ethnic language
Population of country 1
Population of country 2
Nominal gross domestic product of country 1
Nominal gross domestic product of country 2
Country fixed effects
R2

(3)

(4)

(5)

.091**
.070**
.060**
(.016)
(.014)
(.013)
−.042** −.020** −.032**
(.008)
(.006)
(.006)
.064**
.057**
.057**
(.021)
(.019)
(.019)
.173**
.133**
(.037)
(.029)
.001
−.016
(.026)
(.020)
−.003
(.005)
−.002
(.006)
.003
(.004)
.005
(.005)
Yes
Yes
No
.372
.441
.182

Note. All models report ordinary least squares results. The dependent variable is the correlation coefficient of property law. Robust standard errors, two-way clustered on both the first country in the
dyad and the second country in the dyad, are in parentheses. The constant is omitted. N = 4,095.
** p < .01.

The results in Table 2 show that having a shared legal origin is consistently
associated with dyads having property laws that are more highly correlated. Not
only are the estimates for all five specifications highly statistically significant (p <
.001) but the size of the effect is substantively large. Our preferred specification
in column 3 suggests that having a shared legal origin is associated with having
a .09 higher correlation for property laws. To put this effect in perspective, the
standard deviation for property law correlation is .14, which means that having a
shared legal origin has a roughly .6 standard deviation effect. Or, in other words,
an increase of .09 would move a median dyad to being roughly a 75th percentile
dyad in property law correlation.
The results in Table 3 show that having a shared legal origin is associated with
at most slightly higher correlations for antitrust laws. Although the estimates are
statistically significant for several of the specifications, the size of the coefficient
for our key independent variable is consistently small. In our preferred specification in column 3, the coefficient for shared legal origin is .01. However, the
standard deviation for antitrust law correlation is .13, which suggests that having a shared legal origin is associated with roughly a .1-standard-deviation higher
correlation. Using standard rules of thumb (Cohen 1988), this effect is negligible.
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Table 3
Primary Results: Antitrust Law Correlations
(1)
Shared legal origin
Distance

(2)

.001
(.010)

(.019**
(.005)

No
.000

Yes
.611

Contiguous
Common national language
Common ethnic language
Population of country 1
Population of country 2
Nominal gross domestic product of country 1
Nominal gross domestic product of country 2
Country fixed effects
R2

(3)

(4)

(5)

.013**
−.001
(.005)
(.005)
(.010)
−.031** −.028** −.045**
(.004)
(.004)
(.007)
−.004
−.004
.005
(.011)
(.011)
(.018)
.042**
.035
(.014)
(.022)
−.018
−.052*
(.012)
(.021)
−.001
(.007)
−.000
(.005)
.001
(.006)
.000
(.005)
Yes
Yes
No
.633
.635
.099
.009+

Note. All models report ordinary least squares results. The dependent variable is the correlation coefficient of antitrust law. Robust standard errors, two-way clustered on both the first country in the
dyad and the second country in the dyad, are in parentheses. The constant is omitted. N = 4,095.
+ p < .10.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.

4.4. Alternative Measures of Legal Origin
Our primary results code countries’ legal origins using data from La Porta,
López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008). There are, however, several alternative
ways to measure legal origins. We specifically test the robustness of our results
when using three of these alternative approaches.
First, we use an alternative measure of legal origins from Klerman et al. (2011).
Their data add the categories mixed and Islamic to the four legal traditions used
by LLSV. For instance, the coding in Klerman et al. (2011) recategorizes Israel
from common law to mixed and Qatar from French civil law to Islamic. In addition, the data in Klerman et al. (2011) correct a number of mistakes in the LLSV
coding.
Second, we use a measure of colonial origins from Klerman et al. (2011).17 Most
countries have legal origins based on their colonial relationships, but for some
countries legal origins and colonial origins are not the same. For instance, some
17
For the data, see Klerman et al. (2011), supplementary data (https://academic.oup.com/jla/
article/3/2/379/899816#supplementary-data). The zipped file includes Klerman_etal_LO_v_CO.dta.
We use the variable LO, which is their coding of legal origins, and the variable CO, which is their
coding of colonial power.
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countries with French legal origins were colonized by countries like Belgium, Italy, and the Netherlands, and some countries that were British colonies drew legal traditions from multiple countries (for example, South Africa). Countries are
coded in Klerman et al. (2011) as having one of six colonial origins: former English colonies, former French colonies, former colonies of other French civil-law
countries, colonies that were part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, other former
colonies, and countries never colonized.18
Third, we also code whether countries have shared legal orders. Klerman et al.
(2011) do not always code countries’ exact colonizer but instead place some colonial powers in the other French civil-law group or the other group instead of
assigning them separate codes as colonizers. Wimmer and Min (2006) document
colonial powers in all territories since 181619 and thus provide more exact information about colonial histories. Using these data, we code countries as having
shared legal orders if they had a colonial relationship—for example, the United
Kingdom and India—or if both countries were colonies of the same c ountry—for
example, India and Australia.
Figure 4 plots the coefficients of interest when using these alternative approaches to coding legal origins. The coefficients for legal origins using LLSV’s
coding are reported in Tables 2 and 3, the coefficients for legal origins using the
coding in Klerman et al. (2011) are reported in Tables OA4 and OA5, the coefficients for colonial origins using the coding in Klerman et al. (2011) are reported
in Tables OA6 and OA7, and the coefficients for shared legal order are reported
in Tables OA8 and OA9. Separate lines plot the five regression specifications initially introduced in Tables 2 and 3. For each group of five lines, the top line is the
coefficient from column 1, the bottom line is the coefficient from column 5, and
our preferred specification from column 3 is shown in black.
The results in Figure 4 show that these alternative ways of measuring shared
legal origins produce results that are similar to our primary ones. The coefficients
for property law are almost all positive, statistically significant, and substantively
large. In contrast, the coefficients for antitrust law are mostly close to 0 and frequently statistically insignificant. In addition to showing that our primary results are not sensitive to the measure of shared legal origins we use, Figure 4 also
makes it clear that it is difficult to know which measure of shared legal origins—
for instance, legal origins or colonial histories—has a stronger association with
countries’ substantive property law or antitrust laws. This is because the confidence intervals are largely overlapping for the alternative specifications. As a re18
When country-level data are transformed into dyads, simply treating two countries, both of
which were not colonized, as having the same colonial history creates bias. Thus, a dummy variable
Both Not Colonized (which equals one if neither country in a pair has been colonized) is included
in these regressions.
19
For the data, see Andreas Wimmer, Data, From Empire to Nation-State (Replication Data),
Territorial Data, 1816–2001 (http://www.columbia.edu/~aw2951/) The variable imppower identifies
the imperial power at a territory level. For an easier-to-use data set, see GitHub, Our World in Data:
Adding Colonial Regimes—Minner and Wim (2006) (https://github.com/owid/owid-datasets/tree/
master/datasets/Colonial%20Regimes%20-%20Minner%20and%20Wim%20(2006)).
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Figure 4. Coefficient plots. A, Property laws; B, antitrust laws

sult, we cannot say with confidence whether countries with shared legal origins,
shared colonial histories, or shared legal orders are more likely to have similar
substantive legal regimes in property and antitrust law.
4.5. Robustness
Our primary results are robust to a range of alternative modeling choices and
specifications. Because these results are consistent with our main findings, this
discussion is brief, and the results are reported in Section OA4 of the Online Appendix. First, other research calculates the similarity of legal regimes on the basis
of the percentage of variables that are coded the same instead of the correlations
across variables (Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton 2009). Our results are robust to
using this alternative approach. Second, our primary results aggregate all types of
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shared legal origins even though there may be heterogenous effects based on the
type of legal origin. But our results are robust when we include separate dummy
variables for different types of shared legal origins. In the Online Appendix, we
also separately report the average correlations for all 10 possible combinations of
legal origins. When disaggregating the data in this way, the patterns are consistent with our overall results. Third, EU member states and the United Kingdom,
regardless of their legal origins, have adopted similar antitrust regimes, which
may negatively influence the overall relationship between shared legal origins
and antitrust laws. But our results remain consistent even when we exclude either
the 27 EU members and the United Kingdom or all European countries. Fourth,
for consistency with our property data, we use all 91 substantive variables in our
antitrust data when measuring the similarity of countries’ antitrust regimes, but
our results are robust to using only the variables that are identified in prior research as the most substantively important (Bradford et al. 2019a).
5. Discussion
Our results suggest that common legal origins predict the similarity in countries’ property laws, but they do little to predict similarity in antitrust laws. For
example, the United Kingdom and New Zealand, which share a legal origin, have
a .17 correlation in their antitrust laws, while the United Kingdom and France,
which do not share a legal origin, have a .27 correlation in their antitrust laws.
Similarly, the correlation in antitrust law between Ireland and the United States
(.53) is lower than that between Ireland and Estonia (.68), even though the former share a legal origin while the latter do not.
While the European examples may be attributed to the direct influence of the
EU, there is a similar phenomenon in Asia. Common-law countries like India,
Malaysia, Pakistan, and Singapore have antitrust laws that are not highly correlated with the United Kingdom’s (.31, .37, .21, and .28, respectively). Instead,
their antitrust laws are more closely aligned with those in countries in civil-law
legal families. For instance, these four countries’ antitrust law correlations with
Taiwan, a member of the German civil-law family, are all higher than their correlations with the United Kingdom (.48, .39, .43, and .35, respectively). Across
these examples, the property laws in those common-law countries remain similar
to their common-law peers.
There are also a few examples in which legal origins would predict certain
countries’ antitrust laws to follow French or German legal tradition, but they followed a different path. For example, antitrust laws of Bolivia (.20 with France; .41
with the United States), Japan (.37 with Germany; .69 with the United States),
Peru (.39 with France; .51 with the United States), and Panama (.49 with France;
.62 with the United States) correlate more closely with countries associated with
the common-law tradition despite their French and German legal origins.
Of course, there are examples in which shared legal origins correlate with both
property and antitrust laws: France and Belgium have a .71 correlation for prop-
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erty law and a .62 correlation for antitrust law, and South Korea and Taiwan have
a .72 correlation for property law and a .65 correlation for antitrust law. There are
also examples of low correlations across both property law and antitrust law when
the dyads do not share a legal origin: Australia and China have a .20 correlation
for property law and a .18 correlation for antitrust law, and Israel and Indonesia
have a .16 correlation for property law and a .19 correlation for antitrust law.
But, in general, countries with shared legal origins are not more likely to have
similar antitrust regimes than countries without shared legal origins. This is likely
for several reasons. For one, countries’ antitrust laws have been shaped through
regulators’ and policy makers’ engagement in various international organizations
and transgovernmental networks. A specialized network of antitrust regulators—
the International Competition Network (ICN)—has been particularly influential,
but more general international organizations—like the OECD and the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development—have fostered global antitrust
convergence through the promotion of international best practices (Tritell and
Kraus 2018).
Another important factor is that antitrust laws are largely a more recent phenomenon, with most countries adopting them after 1990 (Bradford and Chilton
2019). By that time, these countries had many models to emulate. The EU in particular offered an attractive template to emulate given the specific and detailed
nature of EU antitrust laws and their availability in many languages (Bradford et
al. 2019b). The EU’s active push to export its antitrust laws through trade agreements and to extend regulatory cooperation and technical assistance for new antitrust regimes likely further explains why the EU’s influence prevails over that
exerted by legal traditions. Many multinational companies also conform their
global conduct to EU antitrust law as the most stringent law, which entrenches
EU antitrust law as the global de facto norm (Bradford 2020). This de facto convergence often also paves the way for de jure convergence as countries codify EUstyle antitrust laws domestically with the support of their export-oriented corporations that already bear the costs of EU compliance and prefer uniform rules
(Vogel 1997; Bradford 2020).
European Union law also diffuses through its member states. For instance, because Spain and Germany harmonized their laws with EU antitrust law, when
Colombia was copying Spanish antitrust law or Taiwan was copying German antitrust law (correlations of .58 and .57, respectively), they were effectively copying
EU law. This mediating influence of EU members thus explains why Colombia
and Taiwan have antitrust laws that are similar (the correlation is .52) despite
their different legal origins.
The same patterns likely exist in other areas where legal diffusion has been influenced by EU law or other leading regulatory authorities like the OECD (see, for
example, Linos 2013). For example, EU law has become the gold standard globally in data privacy. Today, over 100 countries have adopted privacy laws, most
of them resembling the EU law on data protection (Greenleaf 2014; Schwartz and
Peifer 2017). These countries represent different legal traditions and align many
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common-law jurisdictions with the European civil-law jurisdictions—often for
the same reasons they emulate EU antitrust laws. The same pattern may hold
for other areas where the EU has been a regulatory leader, including food safety,
chemical regulations, animal welfare, antidiscrimination law, and environmental
policy (Bradford 2020).
6. Conclusion
Our results show that shared legal origins are associated with countries having
similar property laws, but they are not associated with countries having similar antitrust laws. This finding adds to the existing, contested debate on the relationship
between legal origins and legal substance by empirically showing that this relationship can vary from one area of law to another. The results also highlight how other
forms of influence, including that exercised by supranational legal institutions
such as the European Union, can override the influence exerted by legal traditions.
Given the growing lawmaking by supranational institutions,20 it is also possible that
the significance of legal origins will further wane in the coming decades.
Our results also point to at least two major avenues for future research. First,
continued research is needed to explore the generalizability of our results. For
instance, although we have no reason to believe that property is unique among
areas of historical legal regulation or that antitrust is unique among areas that
have only recently been regulated, it is possible that our findings are specific to
these areas. In addition, we exclusively test the similarity of countries’ laws on the
books, and we are unable to look at the way those laws are applied and enforced.
Although this concern is one that plagues the entire legal origins literature, future
research should find ways to explore the relationship between legal origins and
laws in action. Moreover, we focus on average effects for a cross section of countries, but it is possible that there are heterogeneous effects across time or subsets
of countries.
Second, future research should do more to document the mechanisms that
produced the patterns we found. For instance, our results may simply be driven
by property law being an old, well-established area of law, while antitrust is a
relatively new area of law in most jurisdictions. Alternatively, the key explanatory variable may be that supranational lawmaking has done little to influence
property law, while the EU and ICN have been critical in shaping antitrust laws
around the world. Property law is also less complex and technical than antitrust
law, which lends the development of antitrust law perhaps more readily to alternative sources of influence. Relatedly, Chang and Smith (2019) suggest that,
because it is easier to change laws when there are fewer ripple effects on other
laws, countries’ isolated legal doctrines may be more likely to converge with
global norms than countries’ legal doctrines that interconnect with many other
20
For instance, in addition to the European Union, at least five other regional organizations have
some degree of supranational competition policy: the Andean Community, East African Community, Economic Community of West African States, European Free Trade Area, and West African
Economic and Monetary Union.
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doctrines. It is possible that property laws may be less likely to evolve because
they are more deeply connected to many other aspects of a country’s legal system.
Moreover, functional theories of legal convergence suggest that countries’ laws
are more likely to converge in cases in which one rule is clearly more efficient
but less likely to converge in cases in which multiple laws are similarly efficient
(Levmore 1987; Dari-Mattiacci and Guerriero 2019). This points to the need for
more research into whether evolution in legal regimes is related to the effects of
legal differences (for example, Acemoglu and Johnson 2005; Guerriero 2016).
Finally, it is possible that laws that are more likely to govern cross-border conduct (such as antitrust) are more likely to be subject to foreign influences compared with laws that primarily govern legal relationships within countries (such
as property).
That said, despite the need for future research, we believe that this article provides the most detailed investigation yet conducted into the relationship between
legal origins and legal substance. And, by doing so, it provides important new evidence about one of the most prominent debates on the influence of legal history
on contemporary economic, political, and social outcomes.
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